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Abstract
This Note argues that Canada should recognize a privilege for media defendants similar to
the United States actual malice standard in order to guarantee fully the freedom of the press set
forth in the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part I examines the recently adopted Charter,
and the similarity between its free press provision and the first amendment of the United States
Constitution. Part II demonstrates how current Canadian libel law curtails freedom of the press
by burdening media defendants. Part III argues that the United States constitutional privilege
better protects freedom of the press as guaranteed in the First Amendment than has the Charter
in Canada. This Note concludes that in order for Canada to ensure media defendants the right of
free speech as guaranteed in the Charter, the Canadian courts should adopt a more protective libel
standard for media defendants, similar to the actual malice standard in the United States.
LIBEL LAW AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: TOWARDS A
BROADER PROTECTION FOR MEDIA
DEFENDANTS
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Canada enacted its Charter of Rights and Free-
doms' (Charter), which for the first time guaranteed certain
fundamental freedoms to the Canadian people. In many re-
spects, the Charter resembles the United States Bill of Rights.
The Charter's guarantee of a free press, in particular, is closely
modelled on the first amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. 2 However, Canada's common law of libel has not par-
alleled modern developments in United States libel law.3
Under Canadian libel law, if a statement is proven defamatory,
it is presumed to be false.4 In contrast, the actual malice stan-
dard5 of United States law provides special protection for the
press by presuming the truth of a statement about a public fig-
ure or on a matter of public interest.6
This Note argues that Canada should recognize a privilege
for media defendants similiar to the United States actual mal-
ice standard in order to guarantee fully the freedom of the
press set forth in the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Part I examines the recently adopted Charter, and the
similiarity between its free press provision and the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Part II demonstrates
how current Canadian libel law curtails freedom of the press by
burdening media defendants. Part III argues that the United
States constitutional privilege better protects freedom of the
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, sched. B,
pt. I, in 1982 R.S.C. 5 [hereinafter Charter].
2. Compare U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ) with Charter, supra note 1; see R. McMurty,
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Ontario View, in THE U.S. BILL OF
RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 151, 152 (W. Mc-
Kercher ed. 1983) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHARTER]).
3. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
4. Shanoff, Introduction to Libel Law, 6 ADvocs. Q., 1, 15 (1985); see Note, Freedom
of the Press: Availability of Defences to a Defamation Action, 45 SASK. L. REV. 287, 299
(1981).
5. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
6. Id.; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974).
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press as guaranteed in the first amendment than has the Char-
ter in Canada. This Note concludes that in order for Canada
to ensure media defendants the right of free speech as guaran-
teed in the Charter, the Canadian courts should adopt a more
protective libel standard for media defendants, similiar to the
actual malice standard in the United States.
I. THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS
The enactment of the Charter7 was a long awaited re-
sponse to calls for the heightened protection of individual
rights in Canada.' Prior to the Charter, fundamental free-
doms, such as freedom of the press, were protected primarily
by traditions of liberty embodied in Anglo-Canadian common
law.9 Provincial and federal legislation also afforded some pro-
tection for civil liberties by prohibiting discriminatory prac-
tices.' 0 However, the absence of a constitutionally entrenched
standard for protecting fundamental freedoms and the dearth
of jurisprudence pertaining to freedom of expression caused
much apprehension about the state of civil liberties in Can-
ada. "
In the early 1960's, the Canadian Parliament attempted to
address this problem by enacting the Bill of Rights,' 2 which
specifically recognized freedom of the press as a "fundamental
freedom."' 3 However, the Bill of Rights was merely a Domin-
ion statute, which could not be enforced against provincial leg-
islation." Thus, it fell far short of the goal of ensuring uni-
7. See supra note 1.
8. See Castel, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. B. REV. 1, 1
(1983); McKercher, The United States Bill of Rights: Implications for Canada, in BILL OF
RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2, at 11-12. But see Smiley, The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms with Special Emphasis on Quebec-Canada Relations, in BILL OF RIGHTS
AND CHARTER 218, supra note 2, at 218-25 (discussing the events leading to the pas-
sage of the Charter and what the author considers to be the document's inadequa-
cies).
9. Castel, supra note 8, at 1.
10. Id.
11. McWhinney, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Lessons of Compar-
ativeJurisprudence, 61 CAN. B. REV. 55, 60 (1983).
12. R.S.C. 1970, app. III.
13. Doody, Freedom of the Press And The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A
New Category of Qualified Privilege, 61 CAN. B. REV. 124, 134 (1983).
14. Id. at 131.
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form protection for individual rights on a national level.' 5
After many years of debate,' 6 the Canadian Parliament en-
acted the Charter as an amendment to the Canadian Constitu-
tion, which was binding on the provinces. 17 The Charter pro-
vides, for the first time, a constitutional guarantee of funda-
mental freedoms, including that of a free press.'"
It is interesting to note the similiarities between the Char-
ter and the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.' 9
Although adopted under significantly different circum-
stances,20 the United States Bill of Rights was "immensely in-
fluential" in the creation of the Charter.2' Indeed, even before
the Charter was adopted, the Canadian judiciary found Ameri-
can first amendment jurisprudence instructive in cases involv-
ing the press's right to freedom of expression. 22 One com-
mentator has suggested that, as the drafters of the Charter
have benefitted from American constitutional law, the Cana-
dian judiciary should look to the American experience in im-
plementing the Charter's provisions in the Canadian context.2 3
The Canadian parliament reserved for the courts the
15. Id.
16. See Russell, The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
61 CAN. B. REV. 30, 32-33 (1983).
17. Id. at 35.
18. See Charter, supra note 1, pt. I, sec. 2b. The Charter section on fundamental
freedoms provides that:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
a) freedom of conscience and religion;
b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including free-
dom of the press and other media of communication;
c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
d) freedom of association.
Id. sec. 2.
19. See Doody, supra note 13, at 135-36. See generally BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHAR-
TER, supra note 2 (various Canadian and United States scholars discussing the Char-
ter, and comparing it with the Bill of Rights).
20. See Westin, The United States Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter: A Socio-
Political Analysis, in BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2, at 39.
21. See McKercher, Introduction, in BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2, at
3-4.
22. See Doody, supra note 13, at 139; Schmeiser, Entrenchment Revisited. The Effect
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra
note 2, at 158, 161.
23. McKercher, The United States Bill of Rights: Implications for Canada, in BILL OF
RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2, at 19.
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power to implement the Charter.2 4 Thus, the Canadian judici-
ary must give authority and meaning to the specific provisions
of the Charter.2 5 The Charter enables courts to enunciate a
broader privilege for media defendants reporting on public af-
fairs.26 Unfortunately, Canadian courts have failed to consider
the Charter in recent libel cases.27 Clearly, however, the courts
must assume a more active role in developing judicial stan-
dards to effectuate the protection of fundamental freedoms en-
visioned in the Charter.28
Although the Canadian Charter and the United States Bill
of Rights purport to uphold the same fundamental freedoms
of speech and press, the substantive differences in United
States and Canadian libel law lead to significantly different re-
sults. This is most apparent in the case of media defendants,
who, because of the unavoidable transmission of broadcast sig-
nals across national boundaries, find themselves subject to li-
bel suits in Canada under legal standards much less favorable
to the media 9 than those provided by United States law."°
It is technologically impossible for the United States to
prevent signals transmitted by United States stations from
travelling through the airwaves into Canada."' In addition, the
Canadian Radio and Television Commission (CRTC) permits
Canadian cable television stations to receive United States sig-
nals and retransmit them throughout Canada, 32 despite the
24. McKercher, The United States Bill of Rights: Implications for Canada, in BILL OF
RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2, at 19.
25. McWhinney, supra note 11, at 64-68.
26. See Doody, supra note 13, at 150.
27. See, e.g., Good v. North Delta-Surrey Sentinel, [1985] 1 W.W.R. 166 (B.C.
Sup. Ct. 1984); Moffat v. British Columbia Television Sys. Ltd., [1985] 1 W.W.R. 271
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 1984); Camporese v. Parton, 47 B.C.L.R. 78 (1983); Sussman v. Eales,
1 Carswell's Prac. Cas.2d 14 (Ont. Sup. Ct. (1985)); Tait v. New Westminster Radio
Ltd., 58 B.C.L.R. 194 (1984).
28. See Knopff & Morton, Judicial Statesmanship and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, in BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2 at 184, 186.
29. See infra notes 37-69 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
31. Affidavit of Anthony Cervini, Vice President, Affiliate Relations, NBC, at 4-6,
Pindling v. National Broadcasting Corp. [sic], No. 17549/84 (Ont. Sup. Ct., filed May
4, 1984) [hereinafter Cervini Affidavit] (papers on file in the offices of the Fordham
International Law Journal).
32. The United States and Canada are both signatories to a treaty that is
designed to prevent this type of rebroadcast. Inter-American Radiocommunications
1987]
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protests of United States broadcasters. 3 The result of these
two facts is that there is a large amount of United States pro-
gramming present in Canada without the approval of the
United States networks.
United States broadcasters create programming believing
that such programming will be subject only to United States
libel law. Thus, it is unfair to subject United States broadcast-
ers to the broader liability standards of Canadian law simply
because of the unintentional and undesired presence of their
programming in Canada 4.3  However, Pindling v. National
Broadcasting Co. demonstrates that United States broadcasters
are subject to libel suits in Canada as a result of programs that
are broadcast and intended to be viewed only in the United
States. The Pindling suit is a libel suit pending in Canada,
brought by the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Lynden 0.
Pindling.3 5 The suit arose from six separate broadcasts by a
United States television broadcaster which originated in the
United States and were seen in Canada by the two methods
previously described.36
II. THE INADEQUACY OF CANADIAN LIBEL LA W WITH
REGARD TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
In all Canadian libel actions, if the plaintiff can prove that
a defamatory statement was published, then falsity is pre-
sumed, and the defendant has the burden of asserting the de-
Convention, December 13, 1937, reprinted in MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS 1931-1945,
at 468.
Article 21 of the Inter-American Radiocommunications Convention provides
that: "The contracting Governments shall take appropriate measures to ensure that
no program transmitted by a broadcasting station may be retransmitted or rebroad-
cast, in whole or in part, by any other station without the previous authorization of
the station of origin."
33. Cervini Affidavit, supra note 31, exhibit "A" (letter from NBC's Canadian
attornies, Herridge & Tolmie, to the Secretary General of the Canadian Radio and
Television Commission, registering the networks' objection to unauthorized Cana-
dian retransmission of their broadcasts).
34. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text
35. Pindling v. National Broadcasting Corp. [sic] No. 17549/84 (Ont. Sup. Ct.,
filed May 4, 1984) (papers on file in the offices of the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).
36. Statement of Claim, Pindling v. National Broadcasting Corp. [sic], at 6-8
(Ont. Sup. Ct., filed May 4, 1984) (papers on file in the offices of the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal)
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fense of truth.37 In order to avoid liability in a libel suit, a de-
fendant usually will try to raise a defense of qualified privilege
or fair comment.3 ' Generally, media defendants are unsuc-
cessful with these defenses.39 Thus, media defendants are in-
adequately protected from libel suits brought by public figure
plaintiffs, thereby undercutting the rights guaranteed by the
Charter.4°
A. The Qualified Privilege Defense
In Canada, the defense of qualified privilege provides that
defamatory statements may sometimes be published without li-
ability if the statements regard a matter of public interest.4
The plaintiff must prove that the publisher knew that the state-
ment was false in order to overcome this defense. However,
the media do not automatically obtain the protection of quali-
fied privilege merely because the subject matter of the state-
37. Christie v. Geiger, 35 A.L.R.2d 316, 329 (Q.B. 1984); Thomas v. Canadian
Broadcasting Sys., 16 C.C.L.T. 113, 142 (N.W.T. Sup. Ct. 1981); Thompson v. NL
Broadcasting Ltd. 1 C.C.L.T. 278, 285 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1976)
38. Shanoff, supra note 4, at 6, 17-18; see infra notes 39-69.
Two other defenses to libel in Canada are justification and absolute privilege.
Id. at 17-18. Justification is an affirmative defense in which the burden lies on the
defendant to prove the truth of the words in their natural and ordinary meaning.
"The defendant must strictly confine his evidence to the particulars of justification
set out in his defence." Id. at 17.
Absolute privilege provides absolute protection against tort liability and
is not defeasible even on proof of express malice. It applies primarily to
statements made between executive officers of government in the perform-
ance of their duties, and to parliamentary and judicial proceedings. Obvi-
ously it is a defence that is unavailable to the media.
Note, supra note 4, at 303.
A more complete discussion ofjustification and absolute privilege is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of these defenses, see P. LEwis, GATLEY ON LIBEL
AND SLANDER (8th ed. 1981).
39. See, e.g., Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd., 90 D.L.R.3d 321 (1979
S.C.C.) (defense of fair comment rejected); Snider v. Calgary Herald 34 C.C.L.T. 27
(Alta. Q.B. 1985) (defense of qualified privilege rejected); Christie v. Geiger, 35
A.L.R.2d 316 (Q.B. 1984) (no justification established); Whitaker v. Huntington, 15
C.C.L.T. 19 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1980) (defense of qualified privilege fails); Thompson v.
NL Broadcasting Ltd. 1 C.C.L.T. 278 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1976) (defense of fair comment
fails); Vogel v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 21 C.C.L.T. 105 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1982)
(defense of fair comment rejected); Thomas v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. 16
C.C.L.T. 113 (N.W.T. Sup. Ct. 1981) (defenses of justification, fair comment, and
qualified privilege all fail).
40. Doody, supra note 13 at 126.
41. See Banks v. Globe & Mail, 1961 S.C.R. 474, 482-83 (discussing fair com-
ment and qualified privilege and when each may be invoked).
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ment is of public interest. 42 Rather, the defense is raised only
after the case goes to trial.43 Thus, at the time of publication,
the newspaper cannot predict whether the story will be pro-
tected or not.
In two influential decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada
reversed findings of a qualified privilege at the trial court level.
Globe & Mail Ltd. v. Boland44 involved statements published by
a newspaper during an election campaign concerning a candi-
date's fitness for office.45 The trial court found that a national
election was a matter of public interest on which the press had
a duty to report. 46 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
while the press has the same right as all citizens to report on
public issues, they do not have a duty to do so. 47 In the ab-
sence of a duty to report, there was no privilege.48
A similiar situation occurred in Banks v. Globe & Mail Ltd,4 9
where the trial court found that a comment on the topic of in-
dustrial relations was privileged as a matter of public inter-
est.5 0  Once again the Supreme Court of Canada reversed,
finding the idea of a newspaper holding a special privilege on a
matter of public interest to be "untenable. 5 1
Boland and Banks are the only Canadian Supreme Court
42. Shanoff, supra note 4, at 17; see, e.g, Cherneshey, 90 D.L.R.3d, 321 (1979
S.C.C.).
43. See generally Shanoff, supra note 4, at 18.
44. 1960 S.C.R. 203
45. Id. The libellous editorial read, in relevant part:
SHABBY TACTICS
One of the less creditable episodes of the election campaign occurred
on Thursday ... when Mr. John Boland, self-styled independent Conserva-
tive candidate, introduced an issue which does not exist in this election. Mc-
Carthy-style, he put forward an ex-Communist in an attempt to show the
Liberals are "Soft on Communism". The results were far from edifying.
Id. at 205.
46. Id. at 204-05.
47. Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. [1961] S.C.R. 474.
50. Id. at 480-81. The editorial in question, in relevant part, reads as follows:
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED
It would seem in retrospect that Mr. Harold C. Banks, Canadian direc-
tor of the Seafarer's International Union, was brought to this country for the
specific purpose of scuttling Canada's deep sea fleet. If this was indeed the
case, he has succeeded admirably."
Id. at 475.
51. Id. at 484.
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decisions regarding the qualified privilege of media defend-
ants, but some provincial courts have recognized "the freedom
of the press to propogate its views and ideas on any issue." 52
In particular, the Ontario Court of Appeals has held that the
press has a duty to report information which is safeguarded by
the defense of qualified privilege.53
Generally, the media has not been successful in avoiding
liability in suits involving matters of public interest.54 How-
ever, there is reason to believe that a special privilege for the
press on matters of public interest increasingly is being recog-
nized. The Canadian Parliament recognized the importance of
this right by including freedom of the press language within
the Charter.55 Some Canadian lower court decisions also seem
to be moving in this direction.5 6 It would appear that the
Charter mandates a reappraisal of the qualified privilege de-
52. Gay Alliance Towards Eqtality v. Vancouver Sun, 97 D.L.R.3d 577, 591
(S.C.C. 1979) This case arose as a result of the refusal of the Vancouver Sun to print
advertisements for an avowedly homosexual newspaper.
53. Id. In Stopforth v. Goyer, 97 D.L.R.3d 369 (C.A. 1979), a federal Minister of
the Crown in Canada made defamatory statements in Parliament about a civil servant
who had recently been fired. The Minister then repeated these statements to the
Canadian press. The Court of Appeals held the qualified privilege applicable in re-
gard to the statements made to the press, stating:
"[T]he electorate, as represented by the media, has a real and bonafide inter-
est in the demotion of a senior civil servant for an alleged dereliction of
duty.... The appellant had a corresponding public duty and interest in
satisfying that interest of the electorate. Accordingly, there being no sug-
gestion of malice, I would hold that the alleged defamatory statements were
uttered on an occasion of qualified privilege.
Id. at 372.
54. See, e.g., Snider v. Calgary Herald, 34 C.C.L.T. 27 (Alta. QB. 1985) (Defend-
ants invoked qualified privilege based on what they believed to be a legitimate public
interest in receiving information on the construction of a transportation system in
Calgary. The defense failed because of the court's finding of actual malice); Whitaker
v. Huntington, 15 C.C.L.T. 19 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1980) (Defendants sought to invoke
qualified privilege based on a duty to report. The court refused to acknowledge that
such a duty existed). But see Camporese v. Parton, 47 B.C.L.R. 78 (1983) (The de-
fendants' report that a home canning lid was unsafe is protected because of the news-
papers duty to report important information to the public.)
55. See supra note 18.
56. See Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, 97 D.L.R.3d 577, 591
(S.C.C. 1979) (recognizing "the freedom of the press to propogate its views and
ideas on any issues and to select the material which it publishes"); Stopforth v.
Goyer, 97 D.L.R.3d 369 (C.A. 1979) (the public has a legitimate interest in the demo-
tion of a senior servant for deriliction of duty and that the defendant had a corre-
sponding interest to satisfy that interest).
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fense so as to promote free speech on matters of public inter-
est.
5 7
B. The Fair Comment Defense
Fair comment is the most important defense for the media
because the defense provides that free, and even harsh com-
ments, on matters of public interest are permissible.5 8 How-
ever, the defendant must clearly distinguish between comment
and fact because only comment that is the honestly-held belief
of the writer is protected.5 9 The distinction between fact and
opinion is one with which the courts have consistently had dif-
ficulty. 60
In Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd. ,61 the Supreme
Court of Canada held a newspaper liable for the defamatory
contents of a letter it published because the comment con-
tained within the letter could not be proven to be the honestly-
held belief of the writers. 62 Fair comment did not apply since
the newspaper could not produce the writer and the opinion
was not the belief of the editors of the newspaper.63
57. Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers, 90 D.L.R.3d 321 (S.C.C. 1979); Doody,
supra note 48 at 139; see also Note, supra note 4, at 299.
58. See generally Rogers, Some Problems of Fair Comment and the Press, 10 ANGLO-AM.
L. REV. 225 (1981); Note, supra note 4, at 307.
59. Rogers, supra note 67 at 236; Note, supra note 4 at 310. See generally Case
Comment, Burnett v. C.B.C. and Maclntyre, 7 DALHOUSIE L.J. 432, 436-37 (1983).
60. Holt v. Sun Publishing Co., 83 D.L.R.3d 761, 763-64 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1978).
See generally Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion: A Spurious Dispute in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203, 1215, 1235 (1962). In Holt, a member of Parliament
sued the Vancouver Sun for printing an editorial criticizing her for interviewing
Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme and stating in front of the reporter her intention to ask
the warden's permission to carry a message from Fromme to convicted murderer
Charles Manson. Id. at 762. She ultimately decided not to carry the message. Id. at
763. The plaintiff was present at the California prison as a member of the Commons
Committee on prisons. Id. at 762.
61. 90 D.L.R.3d 321 (S.C.C. 1979).
62. Id. at 321. The plaintiff in Cherneskey was a lawyer and city alderman. The
defendants were the owner and publisher of a newspaper. Id. at 342. The defend-
ants published a letter to the editor, in response to an article in the newspaper re-
garding a meeting of the city council. The writers of the letter accused the plaintiff of
taking a "racist" position on a matter. Id. at 321.
Prior to trial, the defendants application to have the two writers of the letter
joined as parties was denied. Id. at 328. At trial, counsel agreed that the writers of
the letter were out of the jurisdiction and neither was called as a witness. Id. at 328.
Therefore, it was never established that the letter was the honest belief of the writers.
63. Cherneskey, 90 D.L.R.3d at 325-26.
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Cherneskey contravenes the function of the fair comment
defense, that being the creation of a free and open forum for
debate on public issues. 64 The decision adds another restric-
tion to the freedom of newspapers to comment on public is-
sues because they must be able to prove the opinion is the
honestly held belief of the writer.65 The practical effect of the
decision is that newspapers will only print letters with which
they agree.
It is more logical to base a defendant's liability with regard
to matters of public interest on fault,66 rather than on a distinc-
tion between fact and comment. The fault standard requires a
defendant to prove that his statement is reasonably justified,
and that the basis of the statement is reasonably investigated.6 7
A fault standard is appropriate for fair comment and conforms
with the intent of the Charter 68 to provide protection for a
publication made on a matter of public interest.
69
III. GUARANTEEING A FREE PRESS UNDER
THE CANADIAN CHARTER: THE UNITED
STATES EXAMPLE
The Canadian common law of libel, arising before the
adoption of the Charter, inadequately protects media defend-
ants because it places on them the heavy burden of proving the
truth of a defamatory statement. Because the guarantee of a
free press has achieved the status of a constitutional right, this
libel standard should be re-evaluated and broadened to
achieve the goals of the Charter. It is useful to consider the
American experience in developing standards regarding a free
press since New York Times v. Sullivan. This landmark case
marks the point of divergence between United States and Ca-
nadian libel law.70
64. See Rogers supra note 58, at 225; Note, supra note 4, at 310.
65. Rogers, supra note 58, at 227.
66. Titus, supra note 60, at 1235; Note, supra note 4, at 317.
67. Note, supra note 4, at 317.
68. Id.
69. Doody, supra note 13, at 135.
70. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, 831-35 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS]. This treatise dis-
cusses United States common law fair comment and qualified privilege, which were
changed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963). The common law
is still the current law in Canada.
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A. The United States Actual Malice Standard
The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a media
privilege based on the first amendment to the United States
Constitution, designed to encourage dissemination of informa-
tion related to public issues. 71 The privilege requires a dis-
tinction between public officials as opposed to private individ-
uals. 2 The public person must meet the higher standard, that
of "actual malice," in order to recover for libel.73 The actual
malice standard does not allow a public plaintiff to recover for
libel from a media defendant absent a showing of reckless dis-
regard for the truth, or actual knowledge of falsity.7 4 The rea-
soning behind the standard is that statements made about pub-
lic people generally relate to matters of public interest, and are
made about people whose actions affect the lives of others.7 5
In addition, public plaintiffs often have access to the media to
refute false statements, and therefore do not require as much
protection against defamatory statements as private citizens.76
Whether a plaintiff is a public or private person, some degree
of fault is necessary and strict liability is never permissible. 7
71. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1963) ("The general
proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First
Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.").
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
73. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1967) (The test is not .. .
whether a 'reasonably prudent man' would have published. Rather, there must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
74. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
75. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-45. "Public officials and public figures usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence
have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individ-
uals normally enjoy." Id. at 344.
76. Id.; see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
In Pindling v. National Broadcasting Corp. [sic], No. 17549/84 (Sup. Ct. Onta-
rio, filed May 4, 1984) (papers on file in the offices of the Fordham International Law
Journal), Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden 0. Pindling was invited to appear on a
United States television program carried by the defendant in order to respond to an
allegedly libellous NBC news report. Transcript of "Today" interview with Lynden
0. Pindling, September 12, 1983, exhibit "A", Statement of Claim, Pindling v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Corp. [sic], No. 17549/84 (Sup. Ct. Ontario, filed May 4, 1984)
(papers on file in the offies of the Fordham International Law Journal). Surely, this is an
opportunity that would not be available to a public plaintiff. This additional possibil-
ity for rebuttal justifies the higher burden a public plaintiff must bear in the United
States.
77. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
LIBEL LA W AND CANADIAN CHARTER
B. Adoption of the Actual Malice Standard in Canada
The extent of the United States privilege for media de-
fendants is not clearly defined 78 but essentially it eliminates
the common law notion of "publish at one's own peril," and
substitutes a requirement of fault as a prerequisite to liabil-
ity.79 This is not true in Canada, where libel is essentially a
strict liability tort.8" The United States privilege grants exten-
sive protection to media defendants reporting on "public offi-
cials," 8 1 and innaccuracies are tolerated as long as the plaintiff
cannot establish "actual malice" on the defendant's part.82
The language of the Charter demonstrates that Canada
has also recognized the importance of free discussion on pub-
lic issues, but the failure of the media to succeed in applying
the defenses quashes public debate.83 A constitutionally-based
privilege in Canada similiar to the United States actual malice
standard would protect media defendants far more adequately
than current Canadian libel defenses, 84 thus conforming with
the intent of the Charter.
The Charter provides the Canadian judiciary with the op-
portunity to change this area of libel law. 85 The Pindling case
provides the Canadian courts with the chance to assume a
more activist role in reforming this area of libel law. Thus, the
courts should create a privilege that allows the press greater
freedom to report honestly and fairly, even harshly at times, on
matters involving public officials. In light of the Charter and
its commitment to a free press, Canada should recognize a
fault-based standard of liability in cases involving media de-
fendants. This standard, similiar to that currently available in
the United States, entails shifting the burden of proof of actual
malice from defendant to plaintiff.86 Insofar as the United
States and Canada purport to uphold the same values of free
78. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 70, at 805.
79. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
80. Note, supra note 4, at 316.
81. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
82. Id.
83. Note, supra note 4, at 299.
84. See generally BILL OF RIGHTS AND CHARTER, supra note 2; supra notes 37-70 and
accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 7-36 and accompanying text.
86. See Note, supra note 4, at 317.
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speech, adoption of the actual malice standard seems appro-
priate.
CONCLUSION
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which es-
tablishes a constitutional guarantee of a free press, signals a
new chapter in the history of Canadian libel law. The close
analogy between the Charter and the Bill of Rights of the
United States Constitution suggests that American first amend-
ment jurisprudence may be instructive for the Canadian
courts. A qualified privilege for media defendants, such as that
provided by the United States actual malice standard, would
further the goals of the Charter by offering heightened protec-
tion for a free press.
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